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1. Introduction 
 
The decline of the old cleavages 
Party politics of a large part of the 20th century have been marked by the cleavages described in the 
seminal work by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967): church versus state; working class 
versus bourgeoisie, centre versus periphery, and urban versus rural. Cleavage politics implies a strong 
and stable fusion of party and group identity (Bartolini 2005; Bartonoli and Mair 1999 ; Knutsen & 
Scarbrough 1995). A political landscape defined by cleavages features a neat mapping onto each other 
of identities, ideologies and political actions. It is defined by a fixed connection between social structure 
– i.e. social groups and their interests- on the one hand, and political agency – i.e. political parties giving 
coherence and political expression to the beliefs, values and interests of those social groups- on the 
other hand.  In the words of Bartolini (cited by XXX): “A structural division is transformed into a cleavage 
if a political actor gives coherence and organized political expression to what otherwise are inchoate and 
fragmentary beliefs, values and experiences among members of some social group.” 
Today that type of group based politics with political parties representing specific groups in society, for 
instance socialist parties representing the working class, seems to have come to an end (Dalton et al 
1984; Franklin et al 1992). The reasons fuelling this evolution in post-industrial society are multiple, and 
include tertialization, mediatization, affluence, cognitive mobilization, individualization and 
secularization (Enyedi 2008: 289). These phenomena impacted first of all upon the sheer existence of 
social units in society, and also lessened the group closure, i.e. social groups relying on group party 
channels to be informed and satisfy their preferences, and the ability of social groups to discipline their 
members.   Citizens stopped living in closed and homogeneous socio-political ‘pillars’. The result of the 
process of de-structuring of the traditional cleavages, or the de-alignment of traditional links between 
social groups and parties, is a decline of structural and ideological voting in Western and Central Europe 
(van der Burg 2010).  Electoral behaviour became volatile and ‘floating’ on the waves of  short term 
issue-position, popularity of party leaders and the retrospective evaluation of government performance 
(Enyedi 2008, Enyedi and Deegan-Krause 2010). This lead, for instance, to the (perceived) death of class 
voting (Clark and Lipset 1991). At the same time, political parties no longer appeal to these traditional 
social groups like blue collar workers and turn to an catch-all strategy (Kirchheimer 1966, Katz and Mair 
1995, Przeworski and Sprague 1988). Parties became free from social structural anchors (Enyedi 2008). 
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Traditional cleavages have lost considerable relevance and  voting behaviour has become individualistic 
and flexible. Some scholars, however nuance the picture of de-structuring and de-alignment.  Enyedi 
(2008) and Kriesi (2010) draw attention to significant counter-tendencies that point to the continuous 
relevance of group based politics. Firstly, although blue collar workers increasingly vote for radical right 
populist parties and leftist parties wins votes from the middle class, class patterns in voting behaviour 
not lost all relevance. it has been shown that class divisions still matter for policy positions of voters on 
socio-economic issues (role of trade unions, organisation of social security, etc.). These issues are 
however, increasingly overtrumped as vote determinants by socio-cultural or left-libertarian topics 
(attitudes towards ethnic minorities, etc.). On these topics, workers often take a more authoritarian 
stance, which drives them to (extreme) right parties (Van der Waal et al, 2007). This attractiveness of 
rightist parties does however not mean that their class position no longer determines their points of 
view on socio-economic topics. 
Secondly, the de-structuration or de-alignment theses suffer from conceptualisation problems and 
heavily depend on the use of class categories that no longer adequate characterize contemporary social 
structures. When social status is captured by employer relations, working environment, task structure, 
the autonomy of the job, life styles, consumption patterns, or the ability to change residence, some 
studies show that it still informs voting behaviour (Evans 1999; Oesch 2008).   
Thirdly, other social structures like religion, region and ethnicity still define political behaviour in large 
parts of Europe (Enyedi 2008). Furthermore, also gender structures contemporary mass politics 
(Inglehart and Norris 2000) and age groups (retired people versus people on the labour market) might 
increasingly do so in the near future (Enyedi 2008).  
When electoral participation is added to the mix, the picture becomes even more nuanced in that the 
groups of voters that still tend to vote according to the cleavage logic, still exist, but the electoral 
process increasingly fails to include them. Some scholars contend that the decreasing weight of 
traditional class position is due to the fact that for instance immigrants tend not to vote (Enyedi 2008). 
Hence, class is still important but is simply no longer translated in electoral information. Also Tóka and 
Gosselin (2010) point to the possibility that electoral alignments are in fact still stabilized, and this the 
case in spite of cleavage decline. However, the group of voters with such clear voting predispositions 
constitutes a decreasing share of the population. In the same vein, van der Brug’s research (2010) 
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concludes that structural voting is still alive and kicking, but it is the strongest in the oldest age groups 
and, hence, will ‘phase out’.  
 
The rise of a new value-based cleavage? 
Another important debate concerns not so much the irrelevance of the old cleavages, but the relevance 
of a new cleavage based on value orientations. This value cleavage has been given different names: 
‘authoritarian/libertarian’(Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1994; Dolezal 2010); ‘libertarian-universalistic/ 
traditionalist-communitarian’ (Bornschier 2010); materialist/post-materialist (Inglehart 1977); self-
expression/survival (Inglehart and Baker 2000).  
Controversy exist about whether this division based on values is indeed a cleavage that meets the 
definitional requirement of socio-structural origins and well-defined socio-structural bases. One must be 
willing, as Kriesi (2010) and Enyedi (2008) suggest, to stretch the concept to the extent that it includes 
group-specific party appeals, group-specific behaviour and polarized political systems, regardless 
whether they are caused by social categories or institutions and values. Indeed, the value-based 
cleavage does not neatly fits on social categories or identities. Nevertheless, it has some structural roots 
in terms of social-structural categories of class, occupation, education, generation, and nation (Kriesi 
2010; Stubager 2009).  
Furthermore, the groups defined on value orientation might not feature the same type of closure, social 
control and sanctioning as was the case with the traditional cleavages. But the highly diverse and 
specialised new media do allow for a high level of in-group orientation – what Blumler and Kavanagh 
(1999)  call the ‘electronic equivalents of gated communities’.  Present-day media techniques also feed 
into cleavage politics in another important way: parties can tailor their strategies to specific groups, of 
whom they have more detailed information than ever before (Enyedi 2008: 297). This allows for 
cleavage-centred strategies, at the same time as catch-all-strategies to cater the median voter as well as 
specific groups.  
 
A shifting meaning of  equality: from redistribution to recognition 
The literature on political cleavages sketched in the above paragraphs suggests that traditional 
cleavages have blurred and consequently that the relevance of representing class and religious interests 
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has diminished. At the same time, however, the representation of new groups in society has gained 
interest. Especially the under representation of women and ethnic minorities is questioned (Phillips, 
1995) and efforts are made to enhance their representation. This shift from class and religion to other 
groups occurred simultaneously with a new conception of equality.   
According to Fraser (1997) the retreat from economic egalitarianism has been assisted by new ways of 
thinking about political equality. The old politics of redistribution with a firm focus on class was replaced 
by a  new politics  of recognition focussing on identity groups like women and ethnic minorities. In her 
seminal work Which Equalities Matter? (1999) Anne Phillips elaborates on the fact that through much of 
the twentieth century inequality was understood as primarily a class phenomenon, something to do 
with the distribution of income and wealth and the effects of private property (Phillips 1999: 21). Today 
equality is thought to be foremost a political or cultural matter implying a recognition of the different 
identities based on, for instance, race and gender. The new concept of political equality links equality 
with acknowledgement of difference, which radically differs from the economic equality that was very 
much about erasing (class) differences. Identity politics proclaims that in order to reach equality for 
women and ethnic minorities their different position in society needs to be taken into account and dealt 
with in such a way that it does not trump equal treatment. Indeed, Phillips contends that ignoring the 
different nature of these identity groups, and instead holding on to race or gender neutrality, results 
predominantly in expecting of ethnic minorities and women to conform to norms and institutions that 
were not developed by them or for them. This is the opposite of equal treatment and, hence, equality 
can only be reached ‘through difference’  (Phillips 1999: 25). Furthermore, the recognition approach or 
identity politics is different from the ‘live and let live’ strategy of tolerance because the latter does not 
imply the that difference and equality are thought of together (Phillips 1999: 28). 
In sum, political equality that gained importance in the last few decades predicts a stronger focus on 
groups like ethnic minorities and women. Nevertheless, Phillips stresses, the turn towards political 
equality need not (and should not) lead people away from matters of social and economic concern 
(Phillips 1999: 15). Quite on the contrary, “commitment to political equality gives new urgency and 
importance to the case for economic equality, and this is particularly so because of what is implied in 
recognizing other citizens as one’s equals.” (Phillips 1999: 19) Hence, ideally class (or social status groups 
or groups based on occupation and education) should not drop off the political radar. 
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This shift from an economic understanding of equality towards a more political understanding, ties in 
with the revaluation of a deliberative fashion of democratic decision making as opposed to a procedural 
one that focuses on the right to vote and run for elections. Deliberative democratic decision-making 
entails dialogue, discussion based on argument and talk, and hence the quality very much depends on 
whether all voices are being fairly heard. This echoes the earlier point that group based politics is not 
dead, because good deliberative democracy requires that the views, interests and needs of groups are 
recognized and included in the decision-making process. 
 
New concepts of political representation 
As mentioned above, groups based politics have not withered away with the decline of class based 
strategies. The latter might not have completely disappeared (yet) and new groups have come to the 
fore. Being rational actors political parties develop strategies to connect to these groups and win their 
votes. Overall, political parties apply two types of strategies in that respect, one related to descriptive 
representation, the other related to substantive representation. The descriptive representation strategy 
concerns the inclusion of blue collar workers, women, ethnic minorities, age groups, ... on the electoral 
lists, and the increased presence of these groups in elected assemblies and governments (for ethnic 
minorities see: Bird 2004;  for women see Krook 2009; for blue collar workers see Wauters 2011). The 
substantive representation strategy is about parties and politicians making claims to represent the 
interests, views and needs of specific groups. For doing that, parties often count on descriptive 
representatives of the group concerned, but they can also forge alliances with civil society organisations 
or establish women’s or ethnic minority wings within the party structure in order to feed electoral and 
party programmes with group interests (Celis, Eelbode and Wauters 2011).   
Concerning the substantive representation of group interests and how this relates to society, recent 
developments in the representation theory importantly stress the aesthetic and cultural dimension of 
representation. According to Saward (2010) representative should be regarded as an “artist”, a “maker 
of representations”, a “portrayer of the represented” (Saward 2010: 16). In the process of making claims 
to represent someone (or a group) the representative creates the represented and their interests. This 
approach differs fundamentally from earlier theories on representation that consider substantive 
representation only in terms of a principal-agent relationship in which the representative ‘brings in’ 
already existing interests. The claims making approach to representation, in contrast, conceives 
responsiveness as more dynamic, as a ‘two way street’ (Severs 2010, 2011). Responsiveness of the 
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process of representation can, in this view, be established by elected representative’s claims echoing 
prior existing claims (‘classic responsiveness’), or when elected representative’s claims are accepted by 
the represented (‘a posteriori responsiveness’) (Severs 2010: 418) 
In other words, representatives can echo the claims of groups, but can also construct groups though the 
process of making claims for them and what is in their interests. Similarly, Enyedi (2008: 3) points at the 
role of agency in cleavage politics. Parties are able to define the identity of social coalitions, to create 
new relations among social background variables and parties can intensify group consciousness and 
group specific voting. In his words: “whether new conflicts can institutionalise into cleavages depends to 
a large extent on the elite’s support of the old order, they can have group specific appeals” (Enyedi 
2008: 296).  
 
2. What this paper does and does not 
 
In his Stein Rokkan lecture Kriesi concluded: “The crux is to identify theoretically and empirically the 
relevant social divisions of a world in flux, and to study their political formation.” (ref) This paper 
(partially) takes on this task. It investigates how relevant traditional or new social divisions are in 
contemporary European parliaments: are old cleavages still relevant for the representation and 
mobilization strategies of MPs? Have they been complemented or replaced by new groups? This paper’s 
aim is to describe the prevalence of group based strategies of MPs in contemporary parliaments and our 
level of analysis is the MP representing (or not) specific groups. It is our aim to map which groups are 
represented by MPs, and the parties they belong to. The latter enables us to answer the question 
whether class is still represented, or whether it is indeed true that socialist/social-democratic parties 
have abandoned blue collar workers in favour of middle classes, and that rightist populist parties have 
taken the working class in focus. It also allows us to see to which extent parties are focused on one 
specific group (as was the case in cleavage politics) or whether parties apply a catch all strategy and 
address plural groups. 
It is however not our aim to establish whether this representation of groups is part of cleavage politics. 
We do not deal with the organisational structures of groups in society and how political parties are 
rooted in these, neither do we investigate voter behaviour of these groups. This paper adds important 
insights to the cleavage scholarship in that in investigates whether MPs today see the need to represent 
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‘old groups’ like class and religious groups, and whether and/or new groups are addressed. Regarding 
the latter we leave the issue in the middle whether these groups are addressed as part of the new value-
based ‘cleavage’, e.g. the representation of minority rights as an expression progressivity or democratic 
values like inclusion. As said, we also ignore the matter whether these old or new groups (still) form a  
‘real’ cleavage or not thereby meeting all the definitional requirements to claim such a label. 
Nevertheless, taking new views on representation and the agency role of parties in cleavage politics into 
account, it is, firstly, reasonable to assume that when the representation of old groups occurs, it is a 
stronger indication that this cleavage is still or again relevant, than of the contrary. Secondly, it is also 
reasonable to assume that in case new groups are represented this is a stronger indication that cleavage 
building is occurring, or might occur, than the opposite.  
Another issue, however important, that the paper not addresses is the issue whether groups are 
represented within the framework of economic or political equability, whether group representation is 
occurring in a redistribution or recognition logic. Hence, if our analysis would show that class is still the 
focus of group based political actions we cannot tell whether this is still framed in the old cleavage 
philosophy of economic redistribution, or whether it concerns political equality for, for instance, low 
educated people.  Hence, we cannot reassure Phillips completely that economic egalitarianism is still a 
concern for MPs today when we would conclude that parties are still concerned with class. 
Nevertheless, we assume that Phillips would agree that attention for the political equality for low 
classes is better than no political concern for them at all. 
 
3. Methodology 
Our analysis is based on survey data of the Partirep MP Survey, which contains data about 
characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of regional and federal MPs in 13 European countries (N = 
1972).1
  
 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. These data were weighted according to 
the party strength in each parliament and a correction factor for the overrepresentation of the Swiss 
regional parliamentarians was also included. 
                                                            
1  PARTIREP MP Survey, funded by the Belgian Federal Science Policy BELSPO: www.partirep.eu. 
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As outlined above, it is the aim of this paper to investigate whether old cleavages are still relevant for 
the representation and mobilization strategies of MPs and whether these cleavages have been 
complemented or replaced by new divisions. To that end, we should first indicate what we understand 
when talking about ‘old’ and ‘new’ cleavages. Old cleavages refer to the classic cleavages identified by 
Lipset & Rokkan (1967) and include class and religion. Class contains three social groups: workers ; 
employers and self-employed ; and farmers and fishermen. New cleavages make reference to value-
based groups divided on the basis of gender, age or ethnic origin. On the basis of age, a distinction can 
be made between two subordinate groups: old people and young people. 
In order to tap the representational strategies of MPs, questions about both their attitudes and their 
behavior were incorporated in the questionnaire. Research has shown that MPs who are aware of the 
problems of the social group they belong to and attach importance to these problems, does not always 
succeed in translating these attitudes into behavior due to constraints such as party discipline (e.g. 
Cowley & Childs, 2003). Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between attitudes and behavior 
in our analysis. The first attitudinal question asked MPs about how important it is for them personally to 
promote the views and interests of various groups in society. Substantive representation of social 
groups can be stimulated in two ways: either by descriptive representatives, who can bring in their 
experience in the representational process, or by additional resources, such as contacts with relevant 
organizations, who can feed MPs with their experiences and expertise and can point them to possible 
topics that are relevant for their social group. A second question measures the attitude towards the 
former element, namely the necessity to have a balanced descriptive representation of specific social 
groups in parliament. A third question relates to the latter aspect, i.e. contacts with organizations. This 
question no longer examines attitudes, but behavior. MPs are asked how often in the last year they had 
contact with organizations defending the interests of particular social groups. 
We assume that  by including in our analysis this diverse mix of aspects of representational attitudes and 
activities, we will obtain a realistic picture of the positioning of MPs. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Are cleavages (still) important? 
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Table: Mean and standard deviation of answers on questions about representation for the several social 
groups and median for the ordinal variable about contacts with relevant organisations 
 
  How important is it to 
you, personally, to 
promote the views 
and interests of…  
(1: of no importance – 
7: of great 
importance) 
How important is it 
that the various 
groups (…) are present 
in Parliament in 
proportion to their 
number in the 
population? (1: not at 
all important – 4: very 
important) 
In your role as an MP, 
how often in the last 
year have you had 
contact with the 
following groups, 
persons or 
organizations? (1: 
(almost) no contact– 
5: at least once a 
week) MEDIAN 
Class: employees 
Mean 5,68 
2,74 
0,82 
3,00 
Stddev 1,24  
Class: employers 
and self-employed 
Mean 5,16 3,00 
Stddev 1,42  
Class: farmers and 
fishermen 
Mean 4,67 2,00 
Stddev 1,72  
Religion 
Mean 3,96 1,89 2,00 
Stddev 1,90 0,79  
     
Gender 
Mean 5,60 2,89 3,00 
Stddev 1,33 0,92  
Age: young 
Mean 6,04 
2,67 
0,80 
4,00 
Stddev 1,10  
Age: elderly 
Mean 5,81 3,00 
Stddev 1,16  
Ethnic origin 
Mean 4,90 2,32 2,00 
Stddev 1,61 0,86  
 
- Few attention for representing religious cleavage and for farmers and fishermen and ethnic minorities. 
- Class (both employees and to a lesser extent employers), gender and age are relevant for 
representation. 
  
4.2 Are cleavages related to each other? 
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Categorical Principal Component Analysis (Optimal scaling)2
 
 reveals that the three factors can be 
distinguished: each based on the sort of question (presenting views, descriptive representation, 
contacts). The kind of social group that is involved does not seem to matter that much: the values for all 
kinds of social groups correlate strongly on one given question.  
Component Loadings 
 Dimension 
1 2 3 
Views young ,708 -,196 ,266 
Views elderly ,762 -,267 ,245 
Views employees ,767 -,183 ,245 
Views employers ,669 -,327 ,220 
Views women ,803 -,086 ,248 
Views farmers and 
fishermen 
,737 -,304 ,112 
Views ethnic minorities ,780 -,101 ,203 
Views religious groups ,702 -,206 ,031 
presence in Parliament: 
gender 
,162 ,801 ,316 
presence in Parliament: age ,155 ,771 ,348 
presence in Parliament: 
social class 
,155 ,763 ,324 
presence in Parliament: 
ethnic origin 
,236 ,743 ,229 
presence in Parliament: 
religion 
,240 ,516 ,039 
frequency of contact with 
youth organizations 
-,401 -,143 ,529 
frequency of contact with 
organizations for the elderly 
-,476 -,085 ,510 
frequency of contact with 
workers' organizations and 
trade unions 
-,337 -,309 ,521 
frequency of contact with 
employers' organizations 
-,223 -,142 ,621 
                                                            
2 We cannot use ‘simple’ factor analysis since the variables at stake here are ordinal variables 
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frequency of contact with 
women's organizations 
-,461 -,351 ,356 
frequency of contact with 
farmers' organizations 
-,312 ,061 ,477 
frequency of contact with 
organizations of ethnic 
minorities 
-,370 -,302 ,342 
frequency of contact with 
churches or religious 
organizations 
-,390 -,161 ,468 
Variable Principal Normalization. 
 
All cleavages are related. 
But the correlation between some groups is stronger than for others, as is shown by calculating 
Spearman correlations for presenting views of a particular social group. 
Correlations 
 
Church and 
religious 
groups 
Women Young 
people 
Elderly Employees Employers 
and self-
employed 
Farmers 
and 
fisher-
man 
Ethnic 
minorities 
 Church and 
religious 
groups 
Corr. Coeff. 1,000        
Sig. (2-tailed) .        
N 1305        
Women Corr. Coeff. ,306** 1,000       
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 .       
N 1298 1337       
Young 
people 
Corr. Coeff. ,245** ,569** 1,000      
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 .      
N 1305 1337 1352      
Elderly Corr. Coeff. ,335** ,587** ,655** 1,000     
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 .     
N 1303 1333 1346 1346     
Employees Corr. Coeff. ,284** ,640** ,558** ,609** 1,000    
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 .    
N 1300 1331 1342 1337 1342    
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Employers 
and self-
employed 
Corr. Coeff. ,424** ,404** ,384** ,423** ,389** 1,000   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 .   
N 1300 1326 1337 1335 1329 1337   
Farmers 
and 
fisherman 
Corr. Coeff. ,529** ,437** ,367** ,456** ,391** ,582** 1,000  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 .  
N 1297 1319 1328 1326 1322 1321 1330  
Ethnic 
minorities 
Corr. Coeff. ,399** ,630** ,419** ,432** ,533** ,315** ,378** 1,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 . 
N 1293 1314 1323 1320 1317 1315 1312 1323 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlation between all groups, but between some groups stronger than between others: 
Maybe 3 kinds of clusters of groups can be distinguished: (but these come not forward from the 
Categorical Principal Component Analysis) 
1. women, employees, young and old, and (ethnic minorities) 
2. farmers, fishermen, self-employed, employers 
3. religious groups 
 
4.3 Differences between parties on cleavages 
 
A. New groups and workers  
 
Table 1: Comparison of mean ranks of three variables related to representation of old/young, women, 
ethnic minorities and workers, according to the party family one belongs to 3
 
 
                                                            
3 A Kruskal-Wallis test is conducted to estimate whether differences on each variable are significant. A Mann-
Whitney U test is conducted to estimate whether the mean ranks of the parties differ from the social-democratic 
party (as reference category). The numbers in the tables are mean ranks. This means that all observations are 
ordered according to their score on a variable and that based on this order a mean rank is calculated. 
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Women 
 
 Christian-
democratic 
Conser-
vative 
Green Far-right Liberal-
democratic 
Other4 Social-
democratic 
 
Importance of 
presenting 
views *** 
620,21 
*** 
570,88 
*** 
764,19 
 
614,16 
** 
566,10 
*** 
726,06 
 
737,82 
 
Importance of 
descriptive 
representation 
*** 
587,59 
*** 
480,19 
*** 
1009,85 
*** 
424,49 
*** 
578,07 
*** 
644,34 
*** 
793,86 
 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
*** 
700,79 
 
609,92 
*** 
802,48 
 
450,97 
*** 
561,20 
*** 
590,14 
*** 
748,09 
 
*** p < .001 ; ** p < .01 ; * p < .05 
Employees 
 Christian-
democratic 
Conser-
vative 
Green Far-right Liberal-
democratic 
Other Social-
democratic 
Importance of 
presenting 
views *** 
617,78 
*** 
530,18 
*** 
643,31 
*** 
632,22 
*** 
514,29 
*** 
685,58 
** 
794,93 
 
Importance of 
descriptive 
representation 
*** 
649,31 
*** 
447,84 
*** 
860,44 
* 
517,24 
*** 
647,35 
*** 
569,77 
*** 
773,30 
 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
*** 
606,68 
*** 
649,30 
*** 
643,55 
*** 
427,65 
*** 
502,86 
*** 
682,68 
** 
819,96 
 
 
Young people 
 Christian-
democratic 
Conser-
vative 
Green Far-right Liberal-
democratic 
Other Social-
democratic 
Importance of 680,00 624,65 662,11 684,73 604,25 714,90 702,23 
                                                            
4 Including communists, regionalists, agrarians, etc. Party families with N lower than 50 are taken together in this 
rest category 
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presenting 
views  (p = 0.53) 
ns 
 *   **   
Importance of 
descriptive 
representation 
*** (+ old) 
673,93 
 
546,57 
*** 
760,48 
 
503,15 
*** 
650,42 
* 
668,45 
 
722,94 
 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
*** 
730,44 
 
681,24 
 
534,05 
*** 
652,95 
 
602,41 
** 
611,16 
* 
705,62 
 
 
Old people 
 Christian-
democratic 
Conser-
vative 
Green Far-right Liberal-
democratic 
Other Social-
democratic 
Importance of 
presenting 
views *** 
681,99 
 
631,00 
* 
554,33 
** 
738,49 
 
566,77 
*** 
717,29 
 
704,86 
 
Importance of 
descriptive 
representation 
*** 
See young       
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
*** 
778,22 
 
626,15 
** 
422,45 
*** 
677,57 
 
553,90 
*** 
528,78 
*** 
733,96 
 
 
Ethnic minorities 
 Christian-
democratic 
Conser-
vative 
Green Far-right Liberal-
democratic 
Other Social-
democratic 
Importance of 
presenting 
views *** 
585,41 
*** 
548,51 
*** 
815,14 
*** 
393,74 
*** 
647,90 
*** 
760,24 
** 
745,97 
 
Importance of 
descriptive 
representation 
*** 
560,91 
*** 
522,32 
*** 
909,25 
** 
463,01 
*** 
641,75 
** 
692,19 
 
758,55 
 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
612,66 
*** 
649,33 
** 
813,17 
 
381,27 
*** 
638,08 
** 
638,09 
** 
761,17 
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*** 
 
- Left-right divide 
- Social-democratic and Green MPS find it almost equally important that views of old/young and 
women, are represented, but Greens prefer descriptive representation and Social-democracts do use 
more contacts with organisations. As for ethnic minorities Green MPs are more keen on representing 
them, while social-democratic MPs score higher on representing employees/workers. 
 
B. Religious groups 
 
Table 2: Comparison of mean ranks of three variables related to representation of religious groups, 
according to the party family one belongs to 5
 
 
 Chr-dem Conserv Green Far-right Lib-dem Other Soc-dem 
Importance of 
presenting 
views  
*** 
823,99 
 
785,10 
 
422,57 
*** 
588,34 
*** 
565,39 
*** 
684,59 
** 
568,61 
*** 
Importance of 
descriptive 
representation 
*** 
791,26 
 
716,13 
* 
506,16 
*** 
575,43 
*** 
648,70 
*** 
674,38 
** 
601,28 
*** 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
*** 
857,16 
 
759,92 
* 
546,56 
*** 
522,99 
*** 
599,78 
*** 
626,44 
*** 
617,05 
*** 
*** p < .001 ; ** p < .01 ; * p < .05 
 
Christian-democratic MPs score higher than MPs from other parties. 
                                                            
5 An Kruskal-Wallis test is conducted to estimate whether differences on each variable are significant. A Mann-
Whitney U test is conducted to estimate whether the mean ranks of the parties differ from the christian-
democratic party (as reference category) 
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C. Self-employed and employers  
 
 Christian-
democratic 
Conser-
vative 
Green Far-right Liberal-
democratic 
Other Social-
democratic 
Importance of 
presenting 
views *** 
783,58 
 
736,25 
 
541,23 
*** 
755,42 
 
801,50 
 
641,75 
** 
558,75 
*** 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
*** 
746,50 
 
793,50 
 
486,31 
*** 
530,30 
*** 
743,88 
 
606,95 
** 
635,51 
*** 
 
 
No significant differences between parties from the (centre-)right (Christian-democratic, conservative, 
liberal-democratic) 
 
4.4 Differences between parties on attitudes and behaviour 
 
A scale value is calculated based of the median scores of all groups on an aspect of representational 
activity. 
 Christian-
democratic 
Conser-
vative 
Green Far-right Liberal-
democratic 
Other Social-
democratic 
Importance of 
presenting 
views ** 
677,04 
 
615,97 
** 
645,95 
 
654,09 
 
598,23 
** 
755,30 
 
708,65 
 
Importance of 
descriptive 
representation 
*** 
632,36 
*** 
500,47 
*** 
897,89 
** 
425,27 
*** 
627,93 
*** 
647,01 
** 
770,18 
 
Frequency of 
contacts with 
relevant 
organisations 
*** 
774,58 
* 
709,75 
 
567,96 
** 
453,87 
*** 
569,98 
*** 
606,95 
** 
719,30 
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- Green MPs emphasize descriptive representation, Christian-democratic ones contacts with relevant 
organisations. 
- Conservative and liberal-democratic MPs do not attach much importance to group representation 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have investigated in this paper whether old cleavages are still relevant for the representation and 
mobilization strategies of MPs and/or wether they Have been complemented or replaced by new 
groups. 
It appears from the survey results in 14 European countries that cleavages (both the classic and the new 
ones) are still relevant for the representational behaviour and attitudes of MPs. Some preliminary 
findings can be formulated: green and social-democratic MPs seem to care most for workers, women 
and ethnic minorities, but greens appear to prefer descriptive representation as social-democracts do 
use more contacts with organisations to further the interests of these groups. As for religious groups, 
Christian-democratic MPs are most likely to take care of their interests mostly by establishing contacts 
with these groups. Finally, for employers and self-employed, parties from the right have most attention. 
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